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Abstract
Many fundraisers report donations using categories such as more
than £ 1000, more than £ 10,000 etc. One naturally wonders how we
should categorise donations and whether category reporting can raise
more funds than simple uncategorised reporting. To shed light on
these questions, we employ a signalling game framework in which both
the donors donation and his benets of being in a higher category are
determined endogenously.
Our analysis suggests that categorised reporting can always im-
prove fundraising. Indeed, we show that both a high and a low cat-
egory threshold can increase donations. Categorised reporting, espe-
cially with a high threshold, can though also lead to the existence
of a low donation equilibrium. Fundraisers may then have to choose
between: a safer low threshold and a potentially more lucrative high
threshold where they would also have to try to coordinate individuals
on the desirable equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
Many fundraisers publicise the donations they receive. Although sometimes
the exact amounts donated are given, more typically, donations are publicised
using categories. To give one of many possible examples: Donors to the Royal
Opera House are listed on their website as Platinum, Gold or Silver Patrons
depending on whether their donation is more than £ 21,100, £ 9,050 or £ 4,950.
Recognising that donors use their donations as signalling devices may explain
why fundraisers can use category reporting to inuence donations.
Several authors have suggested that donations can be used to signal
wealth, altruism, fairness, political leanings or even intelligence (Frank 1985,
Glazer and Konrad 1996, Harbaugh 1998a, Bénabou and Tirole 2006, Millet
and Dewitte 2007, Ellingsen and Johannesson 2008, Andreoni and Bernheim
2009 and Ellingsen and Johannesson 2011). Supporting these ideas, we cer-
tainly observe people donating more when donations are publicly observable
(Andreoni and Petrie 2004, Soetevent 2005, Alpizar et al. 2008, Andreoni and
Bernheim 2009, Ariely et al. 2009, Carpenter and Myers 2010 and Lacetera
and Macis 2010). Given such donor motivations, one would expect categoris-
ing donations to change donor behaviour since the "signalling technology"
changes. Harbaugh (1998b) reports evidence consistent with this, showing
that alumni donations to a law school converged to the category thresholds
when category reporting was introduced or changed. For example, a cate-
gory threshold of $250 increased the number donating $250 while lowering
the number donating $200 or $300.
Our paper questions whether category reporting can increase total do-
nations. For the law school example, intuition would suggest that category
reporting increased the donations of some, those who donated $250 rather
than $200, but decreased the donations of others, those who donated $250
rather than $300. Should we then expect total donations to be higher or
lower? To answer this question we develop a signalling game in which a
donor, who can be either generous or miserly, donates to a fundraiser.
The amount he donates is observed by others who try to infer his generosity,
o¤ering him esteem if they believe he is generous. We characterise signalling
equilibria which detail expected donations and compare equilibrium dona-
tions with exact reporting to those with category reporting to arrive at our
results.
We nd that category reporting can always improve fundraising. More
specically, we demonstrate that both a high category threshold that increases
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the donation of a generous type and a low category threshold that increases
the donation of a miserly type can always be used to increase donations.
However, we cannot say that such categorisations will always increase dona-
tions if the generous type has little incentive to signal his generosity and/or
the miserly type has a strong incentive to match the donation of the generous
type. In such instances, the outcome depends on which equilibrium individ-
uals coordinate on. Potentially, category reporting can be ine¤ective and
only likely to decrease donations. Overall, therefore, we show that category
reporting can increase or decrease donations depending on the situation. Our
results provide several important implications for fundraising policy.
In relating our results to previous literature, it seems most important to
mention Harbaugh (1998a), McCardle et al. (2009) and Barbieri and Malueg
(2011) who also consider whether category reporting can improve fundrais-
ing. These papers assume each donor can get a higher exogenous amount
of "prestige" or "selective benets" from being in a higher category, inde-
pendently of what other donors do1. Such an assumption is reasonable if
donors simply take pride in being in a higher category, or receive consump-
tion goods (Sieg and Zhang 2011), priority ballet tickets for example, from
being in a higher category. If however, donors are motivated by signalling
and a desire for esteem as we have argued, this assumption seems less ten-
able. To see why, compare someone donating in a high category where he
is the only one donating in this category, to someone donating in a high
category when everyone is donating in this category. One would expect that
the esteem the donor receives will di¤er.2 Certainly, this appears to be a
crucial possibility to consider when comparing category reporting with ex-
act reporting. Unlike previous studies, our signalling game approach allows
us to capture and model such a possibility because observersinferences are
endogenous and thus the benets of being in a higher category are endoge-
nous. Our approach is in line with most recent papers modelling prosocial
behaviour and esteem (Bénabou and Tirole 2006, Ellingsen and Johannesson
1Strictly speaking, strategic concerns are present in Barbieri and Malueg (2011). Since
they use a subscription game: a donor only receives the selective benets if the public
good is provided, this depends on othersdonations. By contrast, our strategic interaction
comes from the selective benets themselves.
2To argue otherwise would require that observers are naïve in some sense in what
they infer from the actions of others. We have argued, elsewhere, this may be the case
(Cartwright and Patel 2010) but are skeptical it would hold for such obviousdistinctions
as with category reporting.
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2008, Andreoni and Bernheim 2009, Cartwright and Patel 2010, Daughety
and Reinganum 2010, Ellingsen and Johannesson 2011 and Soetevent 2011).
We shall see that endogenising the benet of being in a higher category does
indeed have important consequences.
Among these consequences are two particularly interesting and new re-
sults. The rst concerns the e¢ cacy of a low category threshold. A low
threshold does lower the donation of a generous type, but in so doing makes
it easier for a miserly type to appear generous. The extra donation of the
miserly type may be enough to o¤set the loss from the generous type. Al-
though one might expect this to be true only under some strict conditions,
we show that a low threshold can always increase total donations with rather
weak assumptions. Furthermore, because category reporting is often most
e¤ective when the probability the donor is miserly is relatively high, a low
threshold is often more e¤ective because it targets the right type.3
Our second novel result arises from the interaction between signalling and
categorisation. Categorising donations means unlike most signalling games4,
our actions and signals are not mapped one-to-one, but many-to-one. This
property interferes with the typical "unravelling" of pooling equilibria. For
our context, the implication is that a low category pooling equilibrium, where
both types only donate what they intrinsically prefer, can exist if donations
are categorised. This is an important result as it demonstrates once donor
benets of being in a higher category are endogenised, even if the categorisa-
tion is designed optimally, donations may not necessarily increase. Fundrais-
ers should recognise this possibility and act to avoid this outcome.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we present
the model. Section 3 works through the baseline case of exact reporting.
Our main results are found in section 4 where we analyse category reporting
and compare donations to those with exact reporting. We then conclude in
section 5.
3Interestingly others have suggested a contribution cap may increase contributions in
contests such as in political campaigning or political inuence (Che and Gale 1998, Gavious
et al. 2002, Drazen et al. 2007 and Baik 2008). In these settings a cap increases the chances
of a less endowed individual or group winning, and so increases e¤ort to win. This seems
similar in spirit to our nding.
4A recent notable exception is Harbaugh and To (2008).
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2 A signalling model of donations
Consider a standard signalling game in which there is a sender and a receiver.
Interpret the sender as a donor donating to charity or some other organisa-
tion, and the receiver as a friend, colleague, or otherwise who observes the
donation. The donor is one of two types, T , which we call generous (G) and
miserly (M).5 6 The donors type is private information. The observers
prior is that the donor is generous with probability p, for some real number
p 2 (0; 1), and is miserly with probability 1  p.7
The donor can donate any amount x 2 [0;1). If he donates x then he
receives an intrinsic payo¤ of g(x) if generous and m(x) if miserly, where g
and m are real valued functions. We shall assume that function g is di¤er-
entiable, achieves a strict maximum at xg, is strictly increasing for x < xg
and strictly decreasing for x > xg. Similarly, we assume that m is di¤eren-
tiable, achieves a strict maximum at xm, is strictly increasing for x < xm
and strictly decreasing for x > xm. The amount xg is thus the intrinsically
preferred donation of a generous type and xm that of a miserly type. As
one might expect, we assume that the donor intrinsically prefers to donate
more if he is generous, xg > xm. Finally, we shall assume two single crossing
properties,
single-crossing property 1: g0 (x) > m0 (x) for x  xm;
single-crossing property 2: jm0(x)j > jg0(x)j for x  xg:
The rst property implies for all donations x  xm, a miserly type su¤ers less
intrinsic disutility from reducing his donation by one unit than a generous
type does; ruling out counter-signalling equilibria (Feltovich et al. 2002).
Analogously, the second property implies the generous type su¤ers less disu-
tility from increasing his donation by one unit than the miserly type does
for x  xg. This second property will be crucial for many of our results.8
5de Oliveira et al. (2011) have recently identied the existence of "giving types" when
it comes to charity.
6As we shall see in the following sections we can derive several interesting and trans-
parent results with only two types. Note however, that our results would generalise to
nitely many more types.
7Note the primary reason for using generousand miserlyis the convenience of the
letters g and m, alternative interpretations are thus easily accommodated.
8Technically, we are not going to need some of these assumptions, e.g. we could do
without di¤erentiability. But, the assumptions seem mild enough.
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Throughout the following it will be useful to have an illustrating example
and we shall use a quadratic example where
m(x) =  (x  a)2;
g(x) =  (x  b)2
for some real numbers a < b.
Once the donor has made his donation the receiver tries to infer whether
or not the donor is generous. At this point we make the key distinction
between category reporting and exact reporting. If there is exact reporting
the exact amount x donated by the donor is observed. If there is category
reporting then there exists a category threshold bx such that it is only observed
whether the donor donated more than the threshold x  bx or less x < bx.9 We
shall also briey consider the possibility of no reporting where the receiver
is given no information about the donation. The inferences of the receiver
will be summarised by an inference function q that maps from observed
donation to a probability the donor is generous. That is, q(x) 2 [0; 1] is the
inferred probability that the donor is generous if he donates x. Naturally, we
shall require in the category reporting case that q(x) = q(x0) if x; x0 < bx or
x; x0  bx, and that in the no reporting case q(x) = q(x0) for all x; x0.
If the donor is perceived to be generous then he receives an esteem payo¤
of E, a strictly positive real number.10 The total payo¤ of the donor is his
intrinsic payo¤ plus any esteem payo¤, i.e.
U(x;G; q)  g(x) + Eq(x);
U(x;M; q)  m(x) + Eq(x):
A pure strategy s details what the donor will donate if generous and if miserly.
Thus, s(T ) denotes the amount given by the donor if of type T .
Note that since our donor cares about the receivers beliefs, our model is
a psychological game (Battigali and Dufwenberg 2009). With regard to sig-
nalling games, it is relatively standard with one important exception: When
9Note that because the donor is one of only two types it is without loss of generality
that we assume there is a unique threshold with category reporting. This will become
clear as we proceed.
10An equal potential esteem payo¤ is quite likely for some contexts. For example, an
industrys market size is typically well dened and common knowledge, thus the gain from
corporate social responsibility activities, such as donating to charity, ts our assumption
rather well.
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there is category reporting, actions and signals are not mapped one-to-one.
Unlike most signalling games (Fudenberg and Tirole 1991, Riley 2001, Sobel
2009), in our model several actions are represented by a single observable
signal.
3 Donations with exact reporting
We shall start by working through what happens when there is exact re-
porting and compare this with the case of no reporting. This will provide a
benchmark with which to compare donations with category reporting. As is
standard in the literature, we shall focus on pure strategy signalling equilibria
satisfying the intuitive criterion.11 This can be explained as follows.
Given a pure strategy s we shall say that an inference function is consis-
tent with strategy s if the type of the donor is correctly inferred. If there is
exact reporting this requires that
q(x) =
8<:
1 if s(G) = x and s(M) 6= x;
p if s(G) = x and s(M) = x;
0 if s(G) 6= x and s(M) = x:
(1)
A pure strategy signalling equilibrium consists of a pure strategy s and in-
ference function q such that: (i) The donor maximises his payo¤ given the
inference function q. That is,
U(s(T ); T; q)  U(x; T; q)
for any x 2 [0;1) and T = G;M ; and, (ii) The inference function q is
consistent with the strategy s.
As is standard, the denition of a signalling equilibrium, and condition
(1), say nothing about what the inference q(x) should be if s(G); s(M) 6= x.
This means that there will typically be many signalling equilibria, each with
di¤erent assumptions on out of equilibrium beliefs. Somehow we need to
select among these equilibria and we shall do so by applying the most com-
monly used renement for signalling games, the intuitive criterion (Cho and
Kreps, 1987). Informally, the intuitive criterion will exclude any signalling
11A complete existence theorem allowing for mixed strategies is available on request.
(Editor/referees: See appendix 2)
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equilibrium where an out of equilibrium action is attributed to a type who
could never have any incentive to undertake that action.
In a standard signalling game, the least cost separating equilibrium, the
Riley outcome, is selected by the intuitive criterion (Riley 1979b). We will see
this is the case when we have exact reporting in our model. Before coming
to this result we need one preliminary. Let,
xH > xm solve m(xm) = m(xH) + E:
Informally, xH is the most the miserly type would ever donate. The assump-
tions on m guarantee the existence of a unique value of xH .
Proposition 1: If there is exact reporting then there is a unique signalling
equilibrium that satises the intuitive criterion, described as follows:
Trivially separating. The donor gives xg when generous and xm when miserly
if xg  xH .
Separating. The donor gives xH when generous and xm when miserly if
xg < xH .
Proof: All proofs are found in the appendix. 
The intuition behind this result is as follows: The miserly type has an
incentive to donate as much as the generous type, and sacrice some intrin-
sic utility for esteem. Single crossing property 2, however, implies that the
generous type is willing to donate a su¢ ciently high amount to deter the
miserly type. Thus, the miserly type fails to match successfully the donation
of the generous type and donates his intrinsically preferred amount. If the
generous types intrinsically preferred amount is high enough to avoid being
matched by the miserly type then he makes that donation (trivial separa-
tion); otherwise he increases his donation until he avoids being matched and
receives esteem (separation). This is the Riley outcome.
To illustrate we can work through the quadratic example. In this case,
xg = b, xm = a, and it is simple to work out that xH = a+
p
E. So, applying
proposition 1, we can see that if b   a  pE we get a trivially separating
equilibrium where the generous type donates b and the miserly type donates
a. The size of the expected donation is pb+(1  p)a. If b  a  pE then we
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get a separating equilibrium where the generous type donates a +
p
E and
the miserly type donates a. The expected donation is now a + p
p
E. The
closer, therefore, is b to a and the larger is E the more the generous type has
to sacrice in order to signal his type.
Interestingly, the donation of neither type depends on p. The expected
donation however does clearly depend on p and the higher is p then the larger
it is. This is captured in the following ratio where we use Ex to denote the
expectations operator,
Ex [donationjexact reporting]
Ex [donationjno reporting] = 1 +
p(max fxH ; xgg   xg)
xm + p(xg   xm) :
Clearly in a trivially separating equilibrium exact reporting has no e¤ect on
the expected donation. In a separating equilibrium however, exact reporting
increases the expected donation. To illustrate, in the quadratic example one
gets
Ex [donationjexact reporting]
Ex [donationjno reporting] = 1 +
p

a+
p
E   b

a+ p(b  a) :
Donations can, therefore, potentially increase a lot because of signalling if p
and E are large. The question we want to ask is whether category reporting
can increase donations further.
4 Donations with category reporting
Given proposition 1 there are broadly speaking two ways in which one might
expect category reporting could increase donations. The rst possibility is
a high threshold bx > maxfxH ; xgg that could increase the donation of the
generous type. The second possibility is a low threshold bx  xH that could
increase the donation of the miserly type. In examining these possibilities,
we again focus on pure strategy signalling equilibria. The only thing we need
change in the denition of such an equilibrium is the condition for consistent
inferences. The natural requirement, which can be compared to (1), becomes
q(x) =
8<:
1 if x  bx; s(G)  bx; s(M) < bx or x < bx; s(G) < bx; s(M)  bx;
p if x  bx and s(G); s(M)  bx or x < bx and s(G); s(M) < bx;
0 if x  bx; s(G) < bx; s(M)  bx or x < bx; s(G)  bx; s(M) < bx:
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Note that if s(G) = s(M) then the denition of a signalling equilibrium again
says nothing about what inferences should be if x < bx and s(G)  bx or x  bx
and s(G) < bx.
4.1 A high threshold can increase donations
In Section 3 we found that with exact reporting the generous type donates
his intrinsically preferred amount if this is enough to signal his type, or the
lowest donation above this amount that does signal his type. Both of these
amounts are lower than the maximum he is willing to donate to gain esteem.
We dene this amount, let
xgH > xg solve g(xg) = g(xgH) + E:
We can now state the following result.
Proposition 2 (High threshold): For any threshold bx 2 (max fxg; xHg ; xgH ]
there exists a signalling equilibrium satisfying the intuitive criterion where
the expected donation is higher than it would be with exact reporting. It
can be described as follows:
Separating with high threshold. The donor gives bx when generous and xm
when miserly.
The expected donation is maximized when bx = xgH .
By setting a threshold above max fxg; xHg we make it the case that the
only way a generous type can signal his type is by donating more than he
would have under exact reporting. If the generous type donates in the high
category then we know, using the same reasoning as was relevant for Proposi-
tion 1, the miserly type would never be willing to match his donation. Thus,
provided bx  xgH , the generous type has no incentive to deviate from do-
nating max fxg;bxg, appearing in the high category, and receiving esteem for
signalling his type. The expected donation is higher than with exact report-
ing. If bx > xgH , then the intrinsic utility cost of signalling becomes too high
for the generous type, so he too would just maximise intrinsic utility, donate
xg and appear in the low category. It follows that the equilibrium expected
donation is no higher than with exact reporting if bx > xgH .
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To illustrate, in the quadratic example, we get that xgH = b +
p
E. So,
if b   a  pE, and there would be a trivially separating equilibrium with
exact reporting, we get the potential increase in donations of
Ex [donationjhigh threshold]
Ex [donationjexact reporting] = 1 +
p
p
E
a+ p(b  a) :
If b  a < pE we get the potential increase of
Ex [donationjhigh threshold]
Ex [donationjexact reporting] = 1 +
p(b  a)
a+ p
p
E
:
To put this in some context Figure 1 plots the ratio of expected donations for
various parameter values. We see that a well set threshold can, when a = 1,
increase donations by up to a a half. For example, if b = 2 and E = 1 the
generous type donates 2 with exact reporting and 3 with a high threshold,
giving a 33 percent increase in the expected donation if p = 0:5.
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Figure 1: The ratio of donations with category reporting relative to that
with exact reporting, when a = 1.
Overall, therefore, we see that a high threshold can signicantly increase
donations. It does so by forcing the generous type to donate more in order
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to signal his generosity. It is only if the threshold is pushed too high, so
that it is too costly for the generous type to signal his generosity, that a high
threshold cannot increase donations.
4.2 A low threshold can increase donations
That a high threshold can increase the expected donation is not so surprising.
It may be more surprising that a low threshold could increase the expected
donation. This is because it is only by lowering the observed donation of
the generous type that the miserly type would have any incentive to donate
more than xm. Thus, to have any e¤ect a low threshold must increase the
donation of the miserly type, while potentially lowering the donation of the
generous type. These counteracting forces might suggest a low threshold can
only work under certain conditions. It turns out, however, that we are able
to obtain a denitive result showing that a low threshold can always increase
the expected donation. The only thing we require is concavity of the miserly
types intrinsic payo¤ function.
Since we want the miserly type to end up donating in the same category
as the generous type, it will be useful to dene the most the miserly type
would give in such an instance. Let,
xL > xm solve m (xm) = m (xL) + pE.
In order to be denitive about when a low threshold can increase the expected
donation we introduce a further denition. Let
xLL 2 [xm; xL) solve pmaxfxg; xLLg+(1 p)xLL = pmaxfxg; xHg+(1 p)xm:
Note that if xH  xg, and so there would be a trivially separating equilibrium
with exact reporting, then xLL = xm. If xH > xg then xLL > xm. The
following result considers thresholds where xm < bx  xL.12
Proposition 3 (Low threshold): For any threshold bx 2 (xLL; xL] there
exists a signalling equilibrium satisfying the intuitive criterion where the
12Note that for clarity we omit analysis of intermediate threshold levels, xL < bx 
max fxg; xHg, from the paper (Editor/referees: see Appendix 2). Since a high or low
threshold can always give a greater expected donation than an intermediate threshold, we
are not particularly interested in this range.
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expected donation is higher than it would be with exact reporting. It can be
described as follows:
Pooling above the threshold. The donor gives max fbx; xgg when generous andbx when miserly.
The expected donation is maximized when bx = xL.
Suppose we set some low threshold and the generous type donates in the
high category, he then clearly donatesmax fxg; bxg. Since we set the threshold
su¢ ciently low, bx  xL, the miserly type is willing to forgo intrinsic utility
to appear in the same category as the generous type. So, he donates bx.
Thus, by making it easier for the miserly type to make the same observed
donation as the generous type, we induce the miserly type to donate more. If
exact reporting gave a trivially separating equilibrium, clearly a low threshold
increases the expected donation as the generous types donation is unchanged
and the miserly type donates more. But why does a low threshold also work
when exact reporting gives a separating equilibrium? To understand why
concavity of m implies the decrease in the generous types donation is more
than o¤set by the increase in the miserly types donation, consider a low
threshold of xL using Figure 2.
Figure 2: Concavity of m and the e¢ cacy of a low threshold of xL
Recall xL and xH are donations where a miserly type is indi¤erent between
donating xm and receiving no esteem or making these larger donations and
receiving esteem of pE and E respectively. Concavity of m implies a miserly
type gets increasingly more disutility the greater the donation is above xm ,
13
thus a proportional increase in esteem on o¤er would lead to a less than
proportional increase in the indi¤erence donation. As the arrows on the
diagram illustrate, this implies that the ratio of esteem on o¤er is less than
the ratio of the increase in donation, E
pE
< xH xm
xL xm or xL > pxH + (1  p)xm.
Concavity of m therefore means the expected decrease in donation from a
generous type is more than o¤set by the expected increase in donation from
the miserly type, a low threshold works. It does so provided bx > xLL.
In the quadratic example we get xL = a +
p
pE. So, if b  a  ppE (or
xL  xg) we get the potential increase in donations of
Ex [donationjlow threshold]
Ex [donationjexact reporting] = 1 +
(1  p)ppE
a+ p(b  a) :
If b  a < ppE (or xL  xg) we get the potential increase in donations of
Ex [donationjlow threshold]
Ex [donationjexact reporting] = 1 +
p
pE(1 pp)
a+ p
p
E
:
Again, to put this in some context Figure 3 plots the ratio of expected do-
nations for various parameter values.13 Signicant increases in the expected
donation can be observed.
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Figure 3: The ratio of donations with category reporting relative to that
with exact reporting, when a = 1.
13Note that the plots stop at di¤erent values of x as xL di¤ers.
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That a low threshold can increase donations is an important result be-
cause it shows that category reporting can be used e¤ectively in two very
di¤erent ways. To go one step further we need to question whether the high
or the low threshold is most e¤ective.
4.3 A high or low threshold?
Given that a high threshold works best when bx = xgH and a low threshold
works best when bx = xL, it is a simple matter to compare the expected
donation with a low and high threshold and say which is larger. To illustrate
we can work through the quadratic example. In this case,
Ex [donationjhigh threshold] = a+ p

b+
p
E   a

and
Ex [donationjlow threshold] =

a+
p
pE if
p
pE > b  a
(1  p)(a+ppE) + pb otherwise :
So, the low threshold results in a higher expected donation ifp
pE > b  a and p < E
b  a+pE
2 ;
or p
pE  b  a and p <
 p
5  12
2
 0:382:
Figure 4 summarises when the low threshold increases donations the most.
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Figure 4: The shaded area is the range of parameter values where a low
category threshold increases the expected donation by more than a high
threshold.
We see that the low threshold may be best for a non-trivial range of
parameters. The lower is p, the more likely the donor is miserly, the more
likely it is that the low threshold is best.
Figure 5 puts this in context by plotting the expected donation with both
a high and low threshold and compares this to the expected donation with
exact reporting. The clear picture we get is that category reporting can
increase donations signicantly and in two very di¤erent ways.
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Figure 5: Maximum donations with a high and low threshold, the ratio of
maximum donations between a low and high threshold, and the ratio of
maximum donations between category and exact reporting, with E = a = 1.
4.4 The low category pooling trap
Our analysis thus far has been relatively optimistic. Not only can category
reporting increase the expected donation relative to exact reporting, but it
o¤ers a choice of two di¤erent methods of doing so. We have however, so far
overlooked an important possibility.
While both high and low thresholds can increase the expected donation,
we cannot always say they will. This is because there may be a further,
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less desirable, signalling equilibrium. We dene the most the generous type
would be willing to donate in order to signal his type rather than pool with
the miserly type, let
xgL > xg solve g (xg) + pE = g (xgL) + E:
Proposition 4 (Pooling): For any threshold bx 2 [xgL; xgH ] there exists
a signalling equilibrium satisfying the intuitive criterion where the expected
donation is no higher, and potentially lower, than it would be with exact
reporting. It can be described as follows:
Pooling below the threshold. The donor gives xg < bx when generous and
xm < bx when miserly.
This result concerns the possibility of a low category pooling equilibrium
where both types just donate to maximise their intrinsic utility, xm and xg,
and both are observed to be in the low category. In other words, category
reporting does no better than exact reporting and strictly worse if there was
a separating equilibrium with exact reporting.
A low category pooling equilibrium is somewhat surprising. In section 3
we saw that with exact reporting the unique equilibrium sees the generous
type increase his donation to a su¢ cient level to avoid being matched by the
miserly type. With category reporting, there exists an equilibrium like this
(Proposition 2), but we now see (Proposition 4) that it may not be the only
equilibrium. There may also exist an equilibrium where the generous type
does not attempt to signal his type. Why does category reporting make this
di¤erence? The answer is that category reporting interferes with the standard
"unravelling" of pooling equilibria.
To illustrate, suppose that the generous type donates xg and the miserly
type matches him by also donating xg. With both exact reporting and cate-
gory reporting, if inferences are consistent, it must be that q(xg) = p. From
this one can deduce a value xh 2 (xg; xH) such that the miserly type could
not have an incentive to donate more than xh. That is, he would be indi¤er-
ent between donating donate xg or xh if q(xh) = 1. Single crossing property
2 implies that the generous type would strictly prefer donating xh or more
if q(x) = 1 for all x  xh. If there is exact reporting this is enough to mean
the candidatepooling equilibrium unravels: The intuitive criterion would
impose q(x) = 1 for all x  xh and the generous type would donate xh rather
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than xg. If there is category reporting and a threshold bx > xgL no such un-
ravelling occurs because, by denition, the generous type prefers donating xg
and getting esteem pE rather than donating bx and getting esteem E. Note
that this implies xgL > xh where xh is as just dened.
The existence of this low category pooling equilibrium is important for
two reasons. Firstly, it illustrates a more general point on how categorising
groups of actions into single signals interferes with unravelling results found
in signalling games. Secondly, it calls into question the ability of category
reporting to increase donations since donations can never be higher than
exact reporting if there is pooling below the threshold. Two obvious questions
now arise: Can fundraisers do anything to avoid this situation? And to what
extent is the usefulness of category reporting constrained by the existence of
this equilibrium?
4.5 Avoiding low category pooling
We have now considered the three possible equilibrium outcomes with cate-
gory reporting. The following result summarises our ndings and also clari-
es that the equilibria characterised in Propositions 2, 3 and 4 are the only
possible pure strategy equilibria satisfying the intuitive criterion.
Corollary 1: Given a threshold bx the only pure strategy signalling equilibria
satisfying the intuitive criterion14 can be summarised as:
(i) If bx 2 (max fxg; xHg ; xgH ] there exists a separating equilibrium with a
high threshold; the expected donation is higher than with exact reporting.
(ii) If bx 2 (xLL; xL] there exists an equilibrium with pooling above the thresh-
old; the expected donation is higher than with exact reporting.
(iii) If bx  xgL there exists an equilibrium with pooling below the threshold;
the expected donation is no higher and potentially lower than with exact
reporting.
Clearly a fundraiser would prefer to avoid pooling below the threshold.
Plausibly, however, depending on m and g, the value of xgL could lie any-
where from above max fxg; xHg to below xLL. Thus, multiple equilibria are
14Strictly speaking, the stronger D1 criterion may be required to rule out other equilibria
when bx 2 (xLL; xL], in specic cases. [Editor/referees: see appendix 2].
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possible. This leaves two options for the fundraiser. They could take steps
to coordinate behaviour on the equilibria with higher expected donations.
Alternatively, they may restrict themselves to using thresholds bx < xgL in
order to rule out the possibility of an equilibrium with pooling below the
threshold. In this case there will exist a unique signalling equilibrium, mean-
ing we can unambiguously say whether category reporting will increase or
decrease the expected donation. The following result summarises when this
is possible.
Corollary 2: If xgL > xH then the expected donation can be increased by
category reporting with either a high or low category threshold. If xgL > xLL
then expected donations can be increased with a low category threshold.
Proof: The only thing of note is that the requirement xgL > max fxg; xHg
can be simplied to xgL > xH because xgL > xg.
In general, we know that xLL = xL < xgL if p and E are su¢ ciently low. It
is, thus, only for high p or E that category reporting will not unambiguously
increase the expected donation. Intuitively, the large amount of esteem on
o¤er ensures the miserly type is willing to donate more than his intrinsically
preferred amount to gain esteem, giving a relatively large expected donation
with exact reporting. The high prior probability of the donor being generous
means that with category reporting, the generous type has little incentive to
signal his type since he receives considerable esteem even if he pools with the
miserly type.
To get some sense of what a su¢ ciently high p or E mean, we return
to the quadratic example. Note that xgL = b +
p
(1  p)E. Recall that
xH = a+
p
E. Thus, xgL > xH if and only if
b  a >
p
E

1 
p
1  p

:
Finding when xgL > xLL is a little bit more cumbersome, but we can begin
by noting that
xLL =
8><>:
a if b  a  pE
p
p
E+a pb
(1 p) if b  a 2 (p
p
E;
p
E)
p
p
E + a if b  a  ppE
:
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It is easily checked that xgL > xLL if b a  p
p
E. From this one can deduce
that xgL > xLL if and only if
b  a >
p
E

p 
p
1  p

:
Figure 6 illustrates for what values of p and E a high and low threshold
can unambiguously be used to increase the expected donation. Figure 7
plots the ratio of the expected donation from exact reporting relative to that
from category reporting where the threshold is set to avoid the possibility of
pooling below the threshold.
Figure 6: The shaded area is the range of parameters for which a low or
high category threshold can unambiguously increase the expected donation.
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Figure 7: The ratio of maximum donation with category reporting
avoiding low category pooling to exact reporting donation, when a = 1.
We see that for low p and E the ratio is always greater than one, thus
category reporting does better than exact reporting. However for higher
values of p and E, this is not the case. At what point category reporting
becomes ine¤ective depends on the di¤erence between the two typesprefer-
ences. The greater the di¤erence, the larger the threshold values of p and E
beyond which point category reporting fails.
The last two subsections have added an important qualier to our view
on category reporting, although it can always be used to increase donations
one may not have the ability to do so with certainty if p and E are large
enough.
5 Conclusion
The objective of this paper was to consider whether category reporting of
donations can improve fundraising. To address this question we developed a
signalling game in which a donor, who was either generous or miserly, makes
a donation to a fundraiser; the fundraiser then reports the donation to others
who try to infer the donors type and o¤er esteem. We found that category
reporting can always increase donations. Indeed, both a high and a low
category threshold can always do better than exact reporting. However, we
also found that when the generous type has insu¢ cient incentive to signal
his generosity and/or the miserly type has su¢ cient incentive to match his
donation, a low donation equilibrium also exists. Furthermore, since this
equilibrium exists more often when using a high rather than a low category
threshold, fundraisers may have to choose between a safer low threshold and a
potentially more lucrative high threshold where they also need to coordinate
individuals. Context and institutions, therefore, matter a lot.
If fundraisers opt for the safer low thresholdthat avoids the possibility
of multiple equilibria then they almost certainly do so at a cost in terms
of the expected donation. Perhaps, therefore, fundraisers should recognise
the possibility of multiple equilibria and take steps to coordinate behaviour
and expectations on more desirable outcomes. For example, charities often
announce early and large donations (e.g. List and Lucking-Reiley 2002).
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With category reporting, this may be one way to coordinate beliefs on the
more desirable equilibrium.
In discussing what to learn from our results it is important to compare
them to Harbaugh (1998a) and McCardle et al (2009). Both of these stud-
ies modelled category reporting assuming (i) a strictly increasing relation
between donations and esteem, and that (ii) category reporting does not
change the relation between observed donations and esteem. With these two
assumptions they show that under very general conditions category report-
ing can increase donations. In our framework we endogenise the esteem a
donor receives by making inferences consistent with donor behaviour. This
means that neither assumptions (i) or (ii) need hold. The two consequences
of this, which distinguish our results, are that (a) category reporting may
easily decrease donations, and (b) it may be appropriate to purposely lower
the donation of one type to increase the donation of another.
To explain this distinction further we note that if types separate then
our analysis is similar to that of both Harbaugh (1998a) and McCardle et al
(2009). This is because when types separate category thresholds can be set
in a way to target the donation of one type without a¤ecting the donation of
another. If types pool then things are di¤erent. Pooling means that a miserly
type will copy the donation of a generous type, and observers know this, so
assumption (i) no longer holds. Furthermore, category reporting is likely to
lead to pooling, meaning that assumption (ii) no longer holds. This latter
point means that donations can be very sensitive to category reporting. This
is why (a) category reporting may decrease donations and care is needed to
set the optimal threshold. Indeed, that donations may increase most if types
do pool is why we nd (b) that it may be appropriate to lower the observed
donation of the generous type.
Useful comparisons can also made between our results and those of Barbi-
eri and Malueg (2011). Although their approach is rather di¤erent from ours,
a subscription game not a signalling game, one can think of their analysis as
examining what happens when di¤erent types pool. They suppose fundrais-
ers force donors to choose between some specic donation amounts, thus
some donors increase their donation and others decrease it. One of their
main results is that if the cumulative density function of donors intrinsic
values is convex then category reporting raises more than exact reporting.
We can think of convexity as analogous to having a high probability of a
generous type in our model. In our analysis, a high probability of a generous
donor meant the existence of the low category pooling equilibrium, in which
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case category reporting may do worse than exact reporting. Intuitively, their
model captures the idea that more generous people means more people will
increase their donation than decrease it. However, since the benet of being
in a high category is exogenous, their model misses the possibility that the
opposite could happen as generous people now have less incentive to increase
their donation.
By comparison to previous work on the topic our framework draws out
the distinction between pooling and separating. The likely success of, and ap-
propriate form of, category reporting will be di¤erent depending on whether
there is likely to be pooling or separation of types. This is something we
would argue will generally emerge in a signalling model of donations. In par-
ticular, our framework was very general with one exception, an assumption
of two types. It is clear, however, that our results can be generalised to an
arbitrary, nite number of donor types.15 While factors such as competing
fundraisers and crowding out of intrinsic motivation may attenuate the ef-
cacy of reporting donations, we would still expect the important contrast
between pooling and separating to remain; it is not an artefact of our model
but something to be expected of signalling equilibria.
Another interesting, and quite general result we expect, is the e¤ect of the
signalling technology we analysed. Our signalling model has an interesting
property in that actions do not map to signals one-to-one, but many-to-
one. We found that this property meant that some pooling equilibria do
not unravel as they would in standard signalling games and are robust to
standard renements. It is worth noting that in the context of a disclosure
game Harbaugh and To (2008) also found this result. Taken together, one
may expect this to be a more general result: When actions and signals are
mapped many-to-one, pooling equilibria are not broken quite so easily.
When there are multiple equilibria one wonders whether we should expect
society to coordinate on pooling or separating. This is an empirical question
that we shall not attempt to address here, but one might suggest that if
fund-raisers do use category reporting then they must think it works. It is
interesting, however, to note the diverse ways in which category reporting
is used. For example, the University of Warwick annually sends its alumni
15Adding types signicantly complicates the analysis because the possible permutations
of separating, pooling and hybrid equilibria grow exponentially. Propositions 2-4, and
their proofs, could, however, easily extend to an arbitrary number of types. Of course, the
more types there are the less likely we might think it would be to get the polar extremes
where all types pool or all types separate.
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a brochure containing a list of donors split into those who donated more or
less than £ 1000. In this example there is only one category threshold. As
a second example, the University of Glasgows donor wall has six category
thresholds ranging from £ 250 to £ 10000. The more categories there are the
more closely is approximated exact reporting of donations. Indeed, given
that there may be ethical or practical di¢ culties in publishing the exact
donation of all donors it could be argued that many categories is as close to
exact reporting as it is possible to get. Also, charities do express concern
about articial donating thresholds, such as a million pounds, and look for
ways to break down such thresholds (Breeze 2009). It is, therefore, not clear
whether and when charities do prefer category to exact reporting.
Appendix 1: Proofs of propositions
Proposition 1 (Exact reporting)
Given the restriction to pure strategy signalling equilibria there are only
two possibilities to consider, (a) a pooling equilibrium where s(M) = s(G),
and (b) a separating equilibrium where s(G) 6= s(M). We consider each
possibility in turn. Let xZ < xm solve m (xm) = m (xZ) + E.
Consider a candidate pooling equilibrium where s(M) = s(G) = x for
some x 2 (xZ ; xH). Let xh > xm be such that m(x) + pE = m(xh) +E. The
intuitive criterion requires that q(xh+") = 1 for some tiny ". Single-crossing
properties 1 and 2 imply g (x) + pE < g (xh) + E. Thus, a generous type
prefers donating xh + " to x. A contradiction.
Consider next a candidate separating equilibrium where s(G) = x and
s(M) = x. Consistency of inferences would require q(x) = 1 and q(x) = 0.
This must imply that x = xm and either x  xZ or x  xH , otherwise
the miserly type could protably deviate from the equilibrium. A miserly
type weakly prefers xm to xZ or anything less, thus a generous type strictly
prefers xg to xZ or anything less (single-crossing property 1), ruling out
x  xZ . Furthermore, a miserly type is indi¤erent between xH and xm, thus
a generous type strictly prefers xH to xg if xH > xg (single-crossing property
2). Finally, inferences q(x) = 0 for all x 2 (xZ ; xH) satisfy the intuitive
criterion and guarantee neither type would deviate to such x. It follows that
there exists a signalling equilibrium satisfying the intuitive criterion as stated
in the proposition.
It remains to show uniqueness. The only remaining possibility, however,
24
is that x > max fxg; xHg and q(x) = 0 for all x < x. This can be con-
sistent with signalling equilibrium, but the requirement that q(x) = 0 for
x 2 (max fxg; xHg ; x) violates the intuitive criterion.
Proposition 2 (High threshold)
Note that single-crossing property 2 implies xgH > xH . Fix bx such that
max fxg; xHg < bx  xgH and let s (M) = xm and s(G) = bx. Equilibrium
requires q (x) = 0 for all x < bx and q (bx) = 1 for all x  bx. The miserly
type has no incentive to deviate since bx > xH and the generous type has
no incentive to deviate since bx  xgH , therefore we have an equilibrium.
Note that, because bx > max fxg; xHg, expected donations are higher than
with exact reporting, clearly highest when bx = xgH . Next consider bx >
xgH . Note that s(G) = bx is no longer consistent with equilibrium because
the generous type would do better to choose xg. The unique equilibrium,
therefore, gives s (M) = xm and s(G) = xg < bx. The expected donation is,
thus, strictly lower than exact reporting if there was a separating equilibrium
and unchanged if there was a trivially separating equilibrium. 
Proposition 3 (Low threshold)
First we characterise the equilibrium, then consider the implications for
donations. Fix bx such that xm < bx  xL and let s(M) = bx and s(G) =
max fxg; bxg. Given single-crossing properties 1 and 2, an inference of q (x) =
0 for all x < bx is consistent with the intuitive criterion16. The miserly type
has no incentive to deviate given bx  xL. This implies, given single-crossing
property 2, that neither does the generous type. Thus we have an equilibrium.
We begin to consider the implications for donations by treating the casebx = xL. Given equilibrium donations, the generous type must donate at least
xL. If the generous type donates xL, then the expected donation is greater
than that with exact reporting i¤ xL > pxH + (1  p)xm, or,
xL   xm
pE
>
xH   xm
E
: (2)
Given real number p 2 [0; 1], dene x > xm such that m (xm) = m (x) + pE
and F := x xm
pE
. Note that if p = p then F equals the LHS of inequality (2)
16Indeed, this is the only permissible inference if we apply the D1 criterion instead
(Editor/referees: see Appendix 2).
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and if p = 1 then F equals the RHS of inequality (2). Further note that,
dF
dp
=
pE   jm0 (x)j (x  xm)
p2E jm0 (x)j =
x  xm
p2E jm0 (x)j

 m (x) m (xm)
x  xm   jm
0 (x)j

;
=
x  xm
p2E jm0 (x)j [jm
0 (x : xm < x < x)j   jm0 (x)j] ;
where the nal step uses the mean value theorem. Concavity of m implies
that jm0 (x : xm < x < x)j < jm0 (x)j. Thus dF=dp < 0 and xL > pxH +
(1  p)xm. Thus a threshold of xL gives a strictly higher expected donation.
All that remains is to consider what happens for lower thresholds. It is
clear that the expected donation is monotonically decreasing in bx and so we
need to nd the point below which donations are no higher than with exact
reporting. With the threshold of bx the expected donation is pmax fxg; bxg+
(1   p)bx. With exact reporting the expected donation is pmax fxg; xHg +
(1  p)xm. This explains the stated condition bx > xLL.
Proposition 4 (Low category pooling)
Suppose bx 2 [xgL; xgH ] and let s (M) = xm and s (G) = xg, implying
q (x) = p for all x < bx. Given that bx  xgL, not deviating is a best-response
for any q (bx) for the generous type and single-crossing property 2 implies the
same for the miserly type. The implication for the expected donation follows
immediately.
Appendix 2: Category reporting equilibria char-
acterisation
This appendix (not for publication) gives a complete charaterisation of all
the equilibria of our category reporting model where mixed strategies are
permitted and xm < bx  xgH . Let  (x; T ) denote the probability a player of
type T donates x. We take it as given that  has nite support. Where the
intuitive criterion is not su¢ ciently strong, we rene our signalling equilibria
with the D1 criterion instead.
Proposition A1 (High threshold): If there is a high threshold ofmaxfxH ; xgg <bx  xgH , then the miserly type donates xm and there exists a,
(a) Separating equilibrium where a generous type donates bx,
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(b) Hybrid equilibrium where a generous type donates xg with probability
1 p
p
h
E
g(xg) g(x^)   1
i
and bx with probability 1
p
h
1  (1 p)E
g(xg) g(x^)
i
, if xgL < x^ <
xgH ,
(c) Pooling equilibrium where a generous type donates xg if x^  xgL.
Proof: Note by single-crossing property 2 and the denition of xH , xgH >
xH . Given bx > maxfxH ; xgg, a miserly type must donate xm. All that
remains is to determine a generous types donation. Given q(x) = q(x0) if
x; x0 < bx or x; x0  bx, clearly in equilibrium  (x;G) = 0 for all x 62 fxg; bxg.
Consider each type of equilibrium in turn.
Separating: Standard reasoning establishes existence of an equilibrium where
 (bx;G) = 1.17
Hybrid : Let  (xg; G) ;  (bx;G) > 0, implying g (xg) g (x^) = (1  q (x < bx))E.
Substituting for q (x < bx) gives,
 (xg; G) =
1  p
p

E
g (xg)  g (x^)   1

.
Note  (xg; G) < 1 i¤ x^ > xgL and  (xg; G) > 0 i¤ x^ < xgH .
Pooling: Let  (xg; G) = 1, implying inference q (x < bx) = p. If bx  xgL,
xg is a best-response. If bx < xgL, note that the intuitive criterion requires
q (bx) = 1 since bx > xH , then xg is not a best-response.18 
Proposition A2 (Low threshold): If there is a low threshold of xm <bx  xL then there exists a
(a) Pooling equilibrium where a generous type donates max fxg; bxg and a
miserly type donates bx,
17Note that there is no out of equilibrium signal if there is a separating or hybrid PBE.
Thus no renement that works by restricting o¤ path beliefs has any bite. These two are
the only separating/hybrid PBE.
18Note: Other renements may give slightly di¤erent results on pooling. D1 would also
set q (x^) = 1 as is less costly for generous type to take action x^, so same result as intuitive.
Undefeated equilibrium only permits o¤-path inference when could get higher payo¤ in
another equilibrium, however highest payo¤ is in pooling, so in this case, perhaps it sustains
pooling even if g (xg)  g (x^) < (1  p)E. Thus intuitive criterion excludes pooling based
on o¤-path inference of a low type.
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(b) Hybrid equilibrium where a miserly type donates bx and a generous type
donates xg < bx with probability 1 pp h Eg(xg) g(bx)   1i and bx with probability
1
p
h
1  (1 p)E
g(xg) g(x^)
i
if bx > xgL,
(c) Pooling equilibrium where a miserly type donates xm and a generous type
donates xg if bx  xgL.
Proof: Which is greater of xg and bx is unclear, thus consider each case
separately.
Case 1: bx  xg.
In equilibrium,  (x;G) = 0 for all x 62 fbx  "; xgg and  (x;M) = 0 for all
x 62 fxm; bxg. Consider each type of equilibrium in turn.
Separating: If  (bx;M) =  (bx  ";G) = 1 a miserly type deviates to xm,
increasing esteem and intrinsic utility. If  (xm;M) =  (xg; G) = 1, a miserly
type deviates to bx given bx < xH . Therefore separating equilibria do not exist.
Hybrid: If  (xm;M) ;  (bx;M) ;  (bx  ";G) ;  (xg; G) > 0 then g (xg)  
g (bx  ") = [q (x < bx)  q (bx)]E and m (bx) m (xm) = [q (x < bx)  q (bx)]E,
a contradiction given g (xg) g (bx  ") > 0 andm (bx) m (xm) < 0. Consider
potential hybrid equilibria where only one type mixes. Where  (xm;M) = 1,
 (bx;M) = 1 or  (bx;G) = 1 one type can deviate to increase both intrinsic
and esteem utility. This leaves  (xg; G) = 1 and a miserly mixing. Then
m (bx) m (xm) = [q (x < bx)  q (bx)]E which gives,
 (bx;M) = p
(1  p)

E
m (xm) m (bx)   1

.
Note  (bx;m)  1 given bx  xL. Therefore no hybrid equilibria exist.
Pooling: If  (xm;M) =  (bx  ";G) = 1, the D1 criterion requires q (bx) = 1,
but then a generous type deviates19. If  (bx;M) =  (xg; G) = 1, the D1
criterion requires q (x < bx) = 0, then a generous type does best to donate
xg and a miserly type bx given bx  xL. Therefore there exists a pooling
equilibrium.
19Note that this equilibrium may be supported by the intuitive criterion as it would
permit q (bx) to be low. The intuitive criterion would give similarly unintuitive results in
other pooling equilibria too.
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Case 2: bx > xg
In equilibrium,  (x;G) = 0 for all x 62 fxg; bxg and  (x;M) = 0 for all
x 62 fxm; bxg. Consider each type of equilibrium in turn.
Separating: If  (bx;M) =  (xg; G) = 1 a miserly type deviates to xm, in-
creasing esteem and intrinsic utility. If  (xm;M) =  (bx;G) = 1 a miserly
type deviates to bx as bx < xH . Therefore separating equilibria do not exist.
Hybrid: If  (xm;M) ;  (bx;M) ;  (xg; G) ;  (bx;G) > 0 thenm (xm) m (bx) =
[q (bx)  q (x < bx)]E and g (xg)  g (bx) = [q (bx)  q (x < bx)]E, contradicting
single-property 2 which implies m (xm)   m (bx) > g (xg)   g (bx). Consider
potential hybrid equilibrium with only one type mixing. Where  (bx;M) = 1
or  (xg; G) = 1 a miserly type can deviate to increase instrinsic and esteem
utility. If  (bx; g) = 1 and a miserly type mixes implying m (xm) = m (bx) +
q (bx)E we have
 (bx;M) = p
1  p

E
m (xm) m (bx)   1

:
Note that  (bx;M)  1 given bx  xL. Finally, if  (xm;M) = 1 and a
generous type mixes implying g (xg) + q (x < bx)E = g (bx) + E we have
 (xg; G) =
1  p
p

E
g (xg)  g (bx)   1

:
Note that  (xg; G) > 0 given bx < xH and  (xg; G) < 1 i¤ bx > xgL. There-
fore, there exists a hybrid equilibrium i¤ bx > xgL.
Pooling: If  (xm;m) =  (xg; g) = 1 the D1 criterion requires q (bx) = 1,
a generous type deviates i¤ bx < xgL. If  (bx;m) =  (bx; g) = 1, the D1
criterion requires q (x < bx) = 0. Given bx  xL, bx is a best response for
a miserly type, further single crossing property 2 implies bx is also a best-
response for a generous type. Therefore there exists one pooling equilibrium
if bx < xgL, otherwise there are two. 
Proposition A3 (Intermediate threshold): If there is an intermediate
threshold of xL < bx  max fxg; xHg then there exists a:
(a) Separating equilibrium where a miserly type donates xm and a generous
type donates max fxg; bxg if xH  bx  xg or bx = xH > xg,
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(b) Hybrid equilibrium where a generous type donates max fxg; bxg and a
miserly type donates bx with probability p
1 p
h
E
m(xm) m(bx)   1
i
and xm with
probability 1
1 p
h
1  pE
m(xm) m(bx)
i
if bx < xH ,
(c) Hybrid equilibrium where a miserly type donates xm and a generous
type donates xg with probability
1 p
p
h
E
g(xg) g(bx)   1
i
and bx with probability
1
p
h
1  (1 p)E
g(xg) g(x^)
i
if xg < bx < xgL,
(d) Pooling equilibrium where a miserly type donates xm and a generous
type donates xg if bx  xgL.
Proof: It is unclear whether xg is greater than bx, thus consider each case.
Case 1: bx  xg
In equilibrium,  (x;G) = 0 for all x 62 fbx  "; xgg and  (x;M) = 0 for all
x 62 fxm; bxg. Consider each type of equilibrium in turn.
Separating: If  (xm;M) =  (xg; G) = 1 a miserly type does best to donate
xm i¤ bx  xH . If  (bx;M) =  (bx  ";G) = 1 a miserly type increases intrin-
sic and esteem utility by deviating to xg. Therefore a separating equilibrium
exists if bx  xH .
Hybrid: For  (xm;M) ;  (bx;M) ;  (xg; G) ;  (bx  ";G) > 0 we needm (xm) 
m (bx) = [q (bx)  q (x < bx)]E and g (bx  ")  g (xg) = [q (bx)  q (x < bx)]E, a
contradiction since m (xm) m (bx) < 0 and g (bx  ")  g (xg) > 0. Now con-
sider potential hybrid equilibria where only one type mixes. If  (xm;M) = 1,
 (bx;M) = 1 or  (bx  ";G) = 1 then one type can increase esteem and in-
trinsic utility by deviating. This leaves  (xg; G) = 1 and a miserly type
mixes implying m (xm) = m (bx) + q (bx)E giving,
 (bx;M) = p
1  p

E
m (xm) m (bx)   1

:
Note  (bx;M) > 0 i¤ bx < xH and  (bx;M) < 1 given bx > xL. Therefore ifbx < xH a hybrid equilibrium exists.
Pooling: If  (xm;M) =  (bx  ";G) = 1 the D1 criterion implies q (bx) = 1
and a generous type deviates. If  (bx;M) =  (xg; G) = 1 then a miserly
type deviates since bx > xL. There exist no pooling equilibria.
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Case 2: bx > xg (implying xH > xg)
In equilibrium,  (x;G) = 0 for all x 62 fbx; xgg and  (x;M) = 0 for all
x 62 fxm; bxg. Consider each type of equilibrium in turn.
Separating: If  (xm;M) =  (bx;G) = 1 the miserly type does best to donate
xm i¤ bx = xH and a generous type does best to donate bx given bx = xH
and single-crossing property 2. Thus an equilibrium exists. If  (bx;M) =
 (xg; G) = 1 a miserly type deviates. There exists a separating equilibrium
if bx = xH .
Hybrid: If  (xm;M) ;  (bx;M) ;  (xg; G) ;  (bx;G) > 0 thenm (xm) m (bx) =
[q (bx)  q (x < bx)]E and g (xg)   g (bx) = [q (bx)  q (x < bx)]E, a contradic-
tion since single-crossing property 2 implies m (xm) m (bx) > g (xg)  g (bx).
Consider potential hybrid equilibria with only one type mixing. If  (xg; G) =
1 or  (bx;M) = 1 then one type can increase esteem and intrinsic utility
by deviating. Suppose  (bx;G) = 1 and the miserly type mixes implying
m (xm;m) = m (bx;m) + q (bx)E thus,
 (bx;M) = p
1  p

E
m (xm) m (bx)   1

:
Note  (bx;M) < 1 given bx > xL and  (bx;M) > 0 i¤ bx < xH . Given
 (bx;M), a generous type has no incentive to deviate if g (xg)   g (bx) <
m (xm)   m (bx), which holds by single-crossing property 2. Therefore we
have an equilibrium. Finally, suppose  (xm;M) = 1 and a generous type
mixes implying g (xg)  g (bx) = [1  q (x < bx)]E, giving,
 (xg; G) =
1  p
p

E
g (xg)  g (bx)   1

:
Note  (xg; g) > 0 given bx  xH and single-crossing property 2 and  (xg; G) <
1 i¤ bx < xgL. Given  (xg; G) the miserly type has no incentive to deviate if
m (xm)  m (bx) > g (xg)   g (bx), which holds by single crossing property 2.
Therefore there are two hybrid equilibria: One existing if xg < bx < xH , the
second existing if xg < bx < xgL.
Pooling: Given bx > xL, a miserly type deviates to xm when  (bx;M) =
 (bx;G) = 1. When  (xm;M) =  (xg; G) = 1 the D1 criterion implies
q (bx) = 1, xg is a best-response for the generous type i¤ bx  xgL. Therefore
there exists a pooling equilibrium if bx  xgL. 
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